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Why are some serious cases of corporate irresponsibility collectively forgotten? Draw-
ing on social memory studies, we examine how this collective forgetting process can
occur. We propose that a major instance of corporate irresponsibility leads to the
emergence of a stakeholder mnemonic community that shares a common recollection of
the past incident. This community generates and then draws on mnemonic traces to
sustain a collective memory of the past event over time. In addition to the natural
entropic tendency to forget, collective memory is also undermined by instrumental
“forgetting work,” which we conceptualize in this article. Forgetting work involves
manipulating short-term conditions of the event, silencing vocal “rememberers,” and
undermining collective mnemonic traces that sustain a version of the past. This process
can result in a reconfigured collective memory and collective forgetting of corporate
irresponsibility events. Collective forgetting can have positive and negative conse-
quences for the firm, stakeholders, and society.
Some instances of corporate irresponsibility,
such as Nestle´’s marketing of baby formula in
developing countries, Nike’s use of child labor,
and Enron’s fraudulent accounting practices, re-
main at the forefront of our collective memory.
Other instances, however, have largely been
forgotten. Take the example of HealthSouth, one
of the largest and most well-respected rehabili-
tation hospitals in the United States. In 2003 the
firm was embroiled in a serious and widely
publicized accounting scandal when then CEO,
Richard Scrushy, was accused of inflating profits
by U.S. $1.4 billion. At the time, many considered
the firm to be a lost cause as it approached
bankruptcy. Today, however, its past woes seem
to have almost been forgotten. The organization
renewed its focus on its core capabilities, relisted
on the stock exchange, and completely rebuilt its
reputation (Goodman, 2003).
The process of forgetting HealthSouth’s irre-
sponsible past appears to have been actively
managed, at least in part. After Scrushy departed,
and “as part of its effort to rebuild the brand’s
credibility, the new management removed all
traces of Scrushy from corporate headquarters
and the company website” (Goodman, 2003).
Scrushy’s name and his corporate message were
erased from the conference center at HealthSouth
headquarters. The company store and museum
were closed, and the executive offices were
opened to all employeeswhopreviously hadbeen
barred from this area under Scrushy (Goodman,
2003). This example indicates that while acts of
corporate irresponsibility can be “naturally” for-
gotten over time, forgetting can also result from
active and instrumental work. In this article we
conceptualize this instrumental work and how it
might facilitate the collective forgetting of corpo-
rate irresponsibility events.
Corporate irresponsibility events are tempo-
rally defined organizational actions that cause
harm to stakeholders. Current research has fo-
cused primarily on the question of how organi-
zations and their stakeholders react to such
traumatic events in the short term (e.g., Barnett,
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2014; Bundy,Shropshire,&Buchholtz, 2013;Godfrey,
Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Rowley & Moldoveanu,
2003). We know less about how corporate irrespon-
sibility events can be collectively forgotten over
longer periods of time. Some researchers have
addressed forgetting in and around organizations.
Investigations of organizational learning and
memory (Levitt & March 1988; Walsh & Ungson,
1991) show that organizational knowledge can
be forgotten (e.g., Brunsson, 2009; de Holan &
Phillips, 2004; Fernandez & Sune, 2009; Hedberg,
1981). There is also a social constructionist ap-
proach to memory in organizations (see, for ex-
ample, Booth&Rowlinson, 2006;Coraiola, Foster,
& Suddaby, 2015; Kipping & U¨sdiken, 2014;
Rowlinson, Booth, Clark, Delahaye, & Procter,
2010; Rowlinson, Hassard, & Decker, 2014;
U¨sdiken & Kieser, 2004) in which researchers
examine how organizations strategically man-
age the past for present ends and, in the process,
forget certain past events (e.g., Anteby &Molna´r,
2012; Foster, Suddaby, Minkus, & Wiebe, 2011;
Suddaby, Foster, & Trank, 2010). This research,
however, focuses in large part on intraorganiza-
tional mnemonic processes. In the few studies of
remembering and forgetting at a supraorganiza-
tional level, researchers have devoted attention
to mnemonic interactions between competitors
(e.g., Greve, 2005; Madsen, 2009). As this article
will demonstrate, however, the collective forget-
ting of corporate irresponsibility involves other
significant stakeholders, including employees,
consumers, civil society organizations, the state, or
the media. To understand this process, we require
a model that accounts for remembering and for-
getting on the part of internal and external stake-
holders. This is critical becausewider stakeholder
groups play a vital role in holding firms account-
able for past corporate irresponsibility events and
ultimately improving their social performance
(Lange & Washburn, 2012).
To better explain how a corporate irresponsi-
bility event can be forgotten by a community of
stakeholders, we turn to social memory studies
(for a review see Olick & Robbins, 1998). Specifi-
cally, we build on the concept of collective
memory—the ways a community may perceive
and reconstruct the past to meet its present needs
(Halbwachs, 1992). Although our context is ad-
mittedly unique, since “disasters are inherently
memorable” (Madsen, 2009: 873), many instances
of corporate irresponsibility are nevertheless
forgotten (e.g., Cooke, 2003; Crane, 2013; Fig, 2005).
Social memory studies are useful in this regard.
They acknowledge that collective forgetting may
result from natural inertia, but they highlight the
fact that it can also be hastened by the in-
strumental activity of interestedactors (Fine, 2012;
Olick, 2007; Schudson, 1995). By developing this
insight, we argue that “forgetting work” is un-
dertaken by actors with an interest in the collec-
tive forgetting of a past corporate irresponsibility
event.
We propose that forgetting work unfolds over
time. In the short term, actors can manipulate the
initial collective memory of a serious incident—for
example, byattempting to influencehow themedia
report on it. In the longer run, actors can silence
stakeholders, especially vocal ones who seek to
sustain the remembrance of the event. Over time,
firms can undermine the collective mnemonic
traces of the past event—for instance, by fabricat-
ingordestroyingevidence.When forgettingwork is
successful, the collective memory of the past event
is reconfigured, eventually resulting in its collec-
tive forgetting. This may have positive organiza-
tional consequences, such as maintenance of the
firm’s identity and legitimacy among stakeholders
(Anteby &Molna´r, 2012; Brown& Starkey, 2000), but
also negative ones, such as failure to learn from
past mistakes (Madsen, 2009) and the increased
likelihood a similar event will happen again
(Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2011).
By positing this argument, we make several
contributions to management and organization
studies. First, we provide an account of corporate
irresponsibility that extends beyond the immedi-
ate reactions to wrongdoing exhibited by firms
and stakeholders (e.g., Barnett, 2014; Bonardi &
Keim, 2005; Bundy et al., 2013; Waldron, Navis, &
Fisher, 2013), since our article considers longer-term
mnemonic processes. Second, given that social
constructionist approaches tend to focus on the
positive features of organizational memory and
forgetting (e.g., Anteby & Molna´r, 2012; Suddaby
et al., 2010), we reveal a darker side of mnemonic
processes inwhichpast transgressions that ought
to be rememberedare forgotten (e.g., Booth,Clark,
Delahaye, Procter, & Rowlinson, 2007). Third, we
contribute to studies of organizational memory
and learning (e.g., Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995;
Madsen, 2009) by drawing attention to the impor-
tance of a wider community of stakeholders en-
gaged in mnemonic activity.
The article is structured as follows. We first re-
view the organizational learning and memory
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literature before examining the contribution that
social memory studies make to conceptualizing
collective memory and forgetting. We then de-
velop our model by discussing corporate irre-
sponsibility events in relation to harm, attention,
and blame attribution. We explain how mne-
monic communities and traces emerge from such
events. Following this, we focus on the notion of
forgetting work and its consequences for collec-
tivememory. Finally, in the discussion sectionwe
posit various moderating effects, limitations, and
avenues for future research in management and
organization studies.
MEMORY AND FORGETTING
Organizational Learning and Memory
Memory has been studied for some time by or-
ganization andmanagement scholars, especially
in connection with knowledge management and
organizational learning (Cyert & March 1963;
Levitt &March 1988). Researchers have examined
how organizations learn by doing in order to im-
prove their production processes (Argote, 2012;
Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Fiol & Lyles, 1985).
They have found that organizations embed past
knowledge in their organizational memory that is
stored in and retrieved from “retention bins”
(Walsh & Ungson, 1991). One of these retention
bins is employees, who do the learning for their
organization and encode it into other retention
bins, such as the organization’s culture, routines,
and structure (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011;
March & Olsen, 1975; Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Top
management can assist employees in encoding
the knowledge they generate by facilitating
communication and knowledge transfer (Crossan
et al., 1999; Tsang & Zahra, 2008).
Relatively less attention has been paid to
knowledge depreciation (e.g., Darr et al., 1995;
Madsen, 2009), unlearning (e.g., Hedberg, 1981;
Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984), and forgetting (e.g., de
Holan & Phillips, 2004; Easterby-Smith & Lyles,
2011). Forgetfulness occurs when knowledge,
even that which is embedded in organizational
memory, is lost over time (Darr et al., 1995). This is
typically due to employee turnover (Easterby-
Smith & Lyles, 2011; Levitt & March 1988), loss or
destruction of archival records, knowledge obso-
lescence (Argote, 2012), and organizational reform
(Brunsson, 2009). This loss of knowledge may or
may not be intentional (de Holan & Phillips, 2004).
When it is intentional, it is often assumed to be
beneficial in terms of firm performance (Hedberg,
1981; Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984).
While the learning literature has advanced
our understanding of mnemonic processes
within organizations, it has offered less about
supraorganizational collective forgetting. Other
studies have examined forgetting beyond the
boundaries of a single firm (e.g., Argote, Beckman,
& Epple, 1990; Darr et al., 1995). Madsen (2009), for
example, investigated howU.S. coalmining firms
forget accidents involving other firms in the in-
dustry. He found that while large-scale mining
disasters remain in the memory of the population
of mining firms and to some extent prevent the
occurrence of future accidents on other sites,
smaller accidents are much more quickly forgot-
ten. Similarly, Desai (2014b) revealed how nega-
tive media coverage of U.S. railroad accidents at
other railroad firms can concentrate organiza-
tional attention and facilitate the implementation
of safety measures, whereas the lack of such ad-
ditional information does not, thus leading to
a failure to learn from the mistakes of others.
The vast majority of this research on inter-
organizational learning focuses on efficiency
and competitive dynamics within and between
firms (Argote, 2012). As a result, it often does not
consider memories held by stakeholders (such as
civil society organizations, governments, or local
communities) who are not competing firms. These
other stakeholders matter because they can help
to hold firms accountable for their activities
(Lange & Washburn, 2012). Indeed, some stake-
holders can play a central role in maintaining
memories of past traumatic events, reminding
others of corporate wrongdoing and putting
pressure on other firms not to make similar mis-
takes (Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). To
help us consider the role that these stakeholders
play in mnemonic processes, we now turn to so-
cial memory studies.
Social Memory Studies
Social memory studies investigate the mne-
monic processes we collectively use when re-
membering and forgetting. The central question
addressed in this body of research concerns the
waypast eventsare socially reconstructed in light
of current beliefs and norms to serve the present
purposes of a community (Gross, 2000; Olick,
1999; Olick & Robbins, 1998). This emphasis is
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compatible with contemporary physiological
and psychological research viewing memory as
an active process of construction and recon-
struction, rather than the mere storage and re-
trieval of information (Brockmeier, 2010; Olick,
2007; Schacter, 1995, 2002). Socialmemory studies
bring to the fore the collective mnemonic prac-
tices of remembering and forgetting that keep
a past event relevant. This allows us to analyze
the way past events are remembered and also
how they can be reinterpreted or forgotten by
communities over time (Halbwachs, 1997/1950;
Schwartz, 1982).
No doubt memories of a past event can and
usually do vary between individuals. However,
collective memories are not simply the aggre-
gate sum of individual memories (Conway, 2003;
Olick, 1999; Schudson, 1995). While the act of re-
membering is individual, actors often draw on
shared narratives of a past event to frame and
informhowandwhat they remember (Brockmeier,
2002;Conway, 2003;Halbwachs, 1997/1950;Olick&
Robbins, 1998). In this sense, collective memories
are shared, extraindividual representations of the
past that resonate with members of a community
at a certain point in time (Olick, 1999, 2007;
Zerubavel, 1996).
Collectivememories of apast event are socially
sustained over time by mnemonic communities
(Misztal, 2003; Zerubavel, 1996), which are groups
of people and organizations that coalesce around
a definite understanding of a past event (Aksu,
2009; Halbwachs, 1997/1950). While some people
in amnemonic communitymayhave experienced
the event directly, othersmay have learned about
it only indirectly. For example, people of the Jew-
ish faith have developed amnemonic community
around the shared remembrance of theHolocaust,
even though many did not experience it firsthand
(Hansen-Glucklich, 2014).While somemembers of
a mnemonic community are relatively passive in
the collective remembering or forgetting process,
others are more active and influential. Active
members have an interest in evoking and nar-
rating a specific version of a past event for a va-
riety of reasons (Fine, 2001; Lang&Lang, 1988). For
example, Fine (1996) demonstrated how the
U.S. presidency of Warren Harding is remem-
bered as one of incompetency, despite somewell-
documented successes. Thismemorywas shaped
by “reputational entrepreneurs,”who used a num-
ber of financial and moral scandals in Harding’s
cabinet to besmirch the entire presidential term.
Some actors can therefore keep a past event sa-
lient in the collective memory of a community by
linking narratives about the past with present
interests and prerogatives (Olick, 2007; Schudson,
1995). Importantly, this does not mean that others,
outside the community, cannot remember this
event. Rather, certain memory processes can
function to galvanize social interconnectivity
within a community as members draw on narra-
tives of the past to crystalize present objectives.
As amnemonic community forms around a com-
mon representationofanevent, it createscollective
mnemonic traces of that event. A mnemonic trace
is a reminder, like a ritualized story, that helps
members of a community remember what the
shared narrative of their past is (Halbwachs, 1994/
1925; Spillman, 1998). These traces are drawn on by
the mnemonic community to sustain the collective
memory of a past event, but sometimes also to
reconfigure or reframe it (Fine, 2001; Olick &
Robbins, 1998). Biases and interpretations are in-
evitably built into mnemonic traces (Gross, 2000).
They therefore carry symbolic meanings, which
embody the beliefs and norms of a mnemonic
community about a past event at a particular point
in time (Halbwachs, 1997/1950; Schudson, 1995).
Mnemonic traces of past events can also be
“maintained by objects in the world” (Hirst &
Manier, 2008: 186). Such “objectivized” (Assmann,
1995b: 128) traces may take the form of archival
documents, monuments, or museums that publicly
represent the past event (Halbwachs, 1997/1950;
Nora, 1989; Ricoeur, 2004). Therefore, mnemonic
communities may draw on immaterial (e.g., stories
redolent with symbolic import) or material (e.g.,
statues or archives) traces, and often both. For
example, an army regiment might collectively
remember a particular battle by creating and
drawing on material mnemonic traces like regi-
ment regalia, photographs, or framed commem-
orations for outstanding duty. But immaterial
traces will also be important, such as regular
storytelling about events leading up to the battle
or myths of bravery (Thornborrow & Brown, 2009).
Collective Memory and Forgetting
A mnemonic community can reconfigure its
collective memory over time, modifying and dis-
carding mnemonic traces in light of its present
beliefs. When this occurs, some aspects of past
events are remembered while others are forgot-
ten (Assmann, 1995a; Schacter, 1995). AsSchudson
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puts it, “A way of remembering is a way of for-
getting” (1995: 348). This suggests that collective
remembering and forgetting are not two pro-
cesses working in diametrically opposed direc-
tions. Rather, they simultaneously create a shared
version of the past to be used in the present. Col-
lective memory, therefore, should be conceptual-
izedas “ahighlyselectiveprocesswhichoscillates
between rememberingand forgetting” (Blaschke&
Schoeneborn, 2006: 109).
Collective forgetting is defined in social mem-
ory studies as the “absence of institutionalized
memory” (Fine, 2012: 59) or the nonexistence of
a shared version of the past. When a specific
collective memory is reconfigured, it can create
several competing versions of a past event (Fine,
2001). It can also make a past event seem irrele-
vant to presentmatters. As a result, the past event
is ultimately erased from collective memory and
forgotten (Assmann, 1995a). Indeed, when a past
event is not picked up and used as a template for
future action, it ceases to remain in collective
memory (Fine, 2012).
Memory typically fades over time both at
the individual (Schacter, 2002) and collective
(Schudson, 1995) levels. It is, in fact, forgetting,
rather than remembering, that is the primary
function of memory (Blaschke & Schoeneborn,
2006), given the vast number of events we en-
counter. Social memory studies suggest that
passing time creates an emotional distance be-
tween a mnemonic community and past events.
When this transpires,mnemonic communities are
likely to forget about the past event (Erdelyi, 1990;
Schacter, 1995, 2002; Schudson, 1995). Forgetting
more than we remember is often useful. Selec-
tive forgetting can have positive consequences
(Hedberg, 1981; Nystrom& Starbuck, 1984), since it
helps mnemonic communities become sensitive
to environmental changes and continue to evolve
in response to their surroundings (Blaschke &
Schoeneborn, 2006). Studies of organizational
learning have similarly demonstrated that se-
lective forgetting is crucial for sustained organi-
zational life and continuity (Brown & Starkey,
2000; de Holan, 2011). For example, in a compara-
tive study of several hotels in Cuba, de Holan
and Phillips (2004) revealed the important role of
managed organizational forgetting in the re-
placement of old routines with new and more ef-
ficient ones. Similarly, Anteby and Molna´r (2012)
examined how an aeronautics firm willfully
omitted certain past events in its “rhetorical
history” (Suddaby et al., 2010), in an effort to
maintain its identity. Social memory studies also
often view collective forgetting as positive, since
it prevents cognitive overload and helps commu-
nities make peace with their past (Connerton,
2008; Erdelyi, 1990; Olick, 2007; Ricoeur, 2004).
While forgetting can result from relatively
passive, inertial mnemonic forces, it can also en-
tail more active, instrumental processes (Fine,
2001, 2012; Lang&Lang, 1988;Olick, 2007). This has
been acknowledged in organizational learning,
as Easterby-Smith and Lyles point out:
History . . . may be reinvented or rewritten to pro-
vide a rationale for current decisions and ambi-
tions. The rewriting of history may be deliberate
and conscious (unlearning), or it may be largely
accidental and unconscious as a result of the
comings and goings of powerful individuals and
groups or simply due to people forgetting the past
(2011: 313).
Hence, somemembers of amnemonic community,
with an interest in a specific version of the past,
act with different levels of intentionality to recon-
figure and reconstruct preceding events. In doing
so they modify, downplay, or even erase these
events from collective memory (Brockmeier, 2002;
Kammen, 1995).
Building on this insight, we explore the activi-
ties that underpin the collective forgetting of cor-
porate irresponsibility events in more depth.
While we acknowledge that there are entropic
forces that can drive the collective forgetting of
such events, we argue that instrumental work
may facilitate this forgetting process. We are
particularly interested in understanding why
some corporate irresponsibility events are for-
gotten more rapidly than others.
THE COLLECTIVE FORGETTING OF
CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY
In order to help conceptualize the collective for-
getting of corporate irresponsibility events, we
posit the followingmodel,as illustrated inFigure1.
To explain the model, we begin by examining the
several important short-term conditions inherent
in a corporate irresponsibility event: the degree of
harm to stakeholders, the level of attention the
event receives, and the attribution of blame. These
conditionscan lead to the formationofamnemonic
community that includes the focal firm as well as
internal and external stakeholders. The resulting
stakeholdermnemonic community both generates
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and draws on mnemonic traces to remember and
forget some aspects of the past event. Using these
mnemonic traces, members of the community ne-
gotiate a shared memory of the event that can
change over time.
This collective memory can also be shaped by
forgetting work, which can include manipulating
the short-term conditions of the event, silencing
specific stakeholders, and undermining mne-
monic traces.When forgetting work is successful,
it reconfigures the collective memory of a past
corporate irresponsibility event. As we explain
below, this makes it more likely that the mne-
monic community will forget the event. This can
have positive consequences, such as identity
maintenance, as well as negative consequences,
such as failure to learn from past mistakes.
Corporate Irresponsibility Events
Corporate irresponsibility involves a firm do-
ing harm to its environment, intentionally or not
(Campbell, 2007; Minor &Morgan, 2011; Scherer &
Palazzo, 2007). A corporate irresponsibility event
is a temporally compact sequence of activities
(Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010)
that a firm is closely associated with. These activ-
ities generate significant negative consequences
for stakeholders and therefore endanger the firm’s
legitimacy and can lead to further negative out-
comes for the firm, including fines or bankruptcy
(Fleming& Jones, 2013;Godfrey et al., 2009; Lin-Hi&
Mu¨ller, 2013).
In general, scholars tend to examine three im-
portant short-term conditions of a corporate irre-
sponsibilityevent that influence the initialcollective
memory of the event: (1) the harm the event creates,
(2) theattentiongiven to theevent,and (3)howblame
is attributed (Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, & Miclani,
1988). Corporate irresponsibility events inflict vary-
ingdegreesofharmonseveral internalandexternal
stakeholders (Barnett, 2014; Schrempf-Stirling, Pa-
lazzo, & Phillips, 2016). Themost obviousharm is the
loss of human life. But corporate irresponsibility
events cangeneratemorewidespreadharmhaving
FIGURE 1
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an impact on a range of stakeholders, such as the
loss of nonhuman life and the loss of livelihoods in
local communities. The diversity and complexity of
the harm created by an event can generate signifi-
cant uncertainty among stakeholders (Perrow, 1984;
Shrivastavaetal., 1988).Onewayuncertaintycanbe
reduced is by means of event attention.
Corporate irresponsibility events attract differ-
ent levels of attention (Desai, 2014b; Hoffman, 1999;
Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). The more focused the at-
tention of stakeholders, the more likely the event
will generate stakeholder responses (Barnett, 2014;
Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010)
and the more salient the event will be for affected
stakeholdersand thegeneral public (Desai, 2014b).
The media play a key role in the short-term strug-
gle over whether an event holds our attention
(e.g., Holt & Barkemeyer, 2012; Zavyalova, Pfarrer,
Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). Being largely focused on
an immediate time horizon (Barkemeyer, Holt,
Figge, & Napolitano, 2010; Kleinnijenhuis, Schultz,
Utz, & Oegema, 2015), the media affect the col-
lective memory of a corporate irresponsibility
event in the short period of time directly following
the event. The media debate that follows a corpo-
rate irresponsibility event, for example, frames it
in a variety of ways that are usually driven by
the way blame is attributed to different actors
(Hoffman & Jennings, 2011).
Stakeholders seek to reduce uncertainty by
assigning responsibility and attributing blame for
the event to particular actors (Lange & Washburn,
2012; Pfarrer et al., 2008). This social process of
sensemaking involves retrospective inquiry into
what transpired during an event, who the central
decisionmakerswere, andwhomay be ultimately
culpable for the event (Gephart, 1993). This process
may occur in a range of different institutionalized
forums, such as public inquiries (Hilgartner &
Bosk, 1988), the media (Desai, 2014b; Zavyalova
et al., 2012), and direct firm-stakeholder confron-
tations (Waldron et al., 2013). Through blame
attribution, the complexity and overlapping re-
sponsibilities associated with the event are re-
duced and projected onto identifiable actors
(Gephart, 1993), even if such attribution can be
disrupted (Javeline, 2003).
Stakeholder Mnemonic Community
When a corporate irresponsibility event occurs
causing significant harm, attracting sufficient
attention, and provoking specific attributions
of blame, it often triggers the development of
a mnemonic community. The mnemonic commu-
nity generated by these processes can include
the firm and some of its internal and external
stakeholders, like the firm’smembers (managers,
employees, shareholders, etc.), competitors and
business partners, consumers, the media and
journalists (who provide accounts of the event),
governments and regulatory institutions, and
other relevant civil society members that may be
affected (e.g., the families of employees, local
communities, etc.) or may have an interest in the
event (e.g., NGOs or activists). A stakeholder
mnemonic community is likely toundergochanges
in membership over time. This occurs when ex-
ternal actors are attracted to the community by
renewed interest in the event or when others join
because they are affected by delayed externalities
of the event. Hence, a stakeholder may be part of
a mnemonic community without having directly
experienced the event in question (Zerubavel,
1996). Typically, employees not directly involved
in causing the event or not experiencing its direct
consequences will hear about it from manage-
ment, fellow employees, customers, and, perhaps,
the media (Desai, 2014b; March & Olsen, 1975).
Within a mnemonic community, some members
“compete to control collective memory, and this is
subject to dynamic change over time” (Fine, 2012:
94). Most members of these communities are rela-
tively passive when it comes to asserting the
“‘correct’way to interpret thepast” (Zerubavel, 1996:
295). However, other members—whomwe will call
“rememberers”—engage more actively in shaping
how the event is remembered. Rememberers often
have an interest in institutionalizing a certain ver-
sion of the event. Activist groups frequently play
the role of rememberers for past corporate irre-
sponsibility events. However, they often lack the
necessary resources and coordination mecha-
nisms to sustain their campaigns over longperiods
of time (Taylor, 1989). Moreover, the most vocal re-
memberers are likely to change as time passes
because of the resources they can access and their
ability to sustain interest in the cause (Pfarrer et al.,
2008).
Collective Mnemonic Traces of Corporate
Irresponsibility Events
A stakeholdermnemonic community generates
a range of collective mnemonic traces of a corpo-
rate irresponsibility event. The community also
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draws on these traces to sustain its collective
memory of the event. Stakeholders often create
highly symbolic mnemonic traces, such as com-
memorations of workers killed or stories of how
tragic events unfolded (Hobsbawm & Ranger,
1983). Employees can generate narratives about
their firm’s past, and management can highlight
certainaspects of aneventwhile obscuringothers
(Booth et al., 2007;March&Olsen, 1975). Collective
mnemonic traces of corporate irresponsibility
events can also have a material component, like
the ruins of a collapsed factory, traces of pollut-
ants in the natural environment, or the physical
deformities they may cause (Shrivastava et al.,
1988). Firms often produce a variety of documents
about the event, including internal memos and
public statements that proffer particular narra-
tives of the event. Other stakeholders, NGOs and
the media in particular, also generate written
traces in the form of incriminating reports on the
firm’s activities or journalistic analyses. Such
collective mnemonic traces provide the raw ma-
terial that mnemonic communities use to help
sustain the collective memory of the event and, in
doingso,maintainaparticular versionof thepast.
FORGETTING WORK
Collective memory is affected by instrumental
forgetting work (Fine, 2012), even if it is “not nec-
essarily calculated” (Schudson, 1995: 352) and the
outcomes are not always those that were ex-
pected (Olick & Robbins, 1998). Forgetting work
involves purposeful attempts to reconfigure, di-
lute, and thwart the collectivememoryof anevent.
We propose that this occurs through the articula-
tion of narratives (Booth et al., 2007; Brockmeier,
2002) and the exercise of power (Kammen, 1995;
Ricoeur, 2004; Schudson, 1995). Narratives give
meaning to the past event so that some aspects
are attended to while others are obscured and
disregarded (Booth et al., 2007; Brockmeier, 2002;
Ricoeur, 2004). Exercise of power “can shape the
interactions among actors that are the un-
derpinnings of memory structures” (Casey &
Olivera, 2011: 308). Power can sanction some
stakeholders as the legitimate bearers of col-
lective memory while disempowering or dis-
qualifying others (Brockmeier, 2002; Ricoeur,
2004; Zerubavel, 1996).
Forgetting work can be undertaken by firms,
their management, or other actors (such as in-
dustry associations and sometimes employees)
who have an interest in mitigating the short- and
long-term negative impacts of the event and en-
hancing the positive consequences of forgetting.
Forgetting work does not necessarily imply co-
ordinated and intentional action. Rather, it is of-
ten the result of a range of activities with different
intended time horizons and degrees of intention-
ality. Furthermore, forgettingwork rarely exists in
isolation. Firms engaged in forgetting work can
also react to an event in other ways at the same
time, like asking for forgiveness (Pfarrer et al.,
2008).
We suggest that forgetting work unfolds over
time. In the short term it involves manipulating
the immediate perceptions of a corporate irre-
sponsibility event. In the longer term forgetting
work can entail silencing members of the mne-
monic community and undermining collective
mnemonic traces. We now examine these three
different types of forgetting work in more depth.
Manipulating: Forgetting Work Following
a Corporate Irresponsibility Event
Manipulation is the primary form of forgetting
work that immediately follows an instance of
corporate irresponsibility. Its purpose is to control
the initial collective memory of an event so that
the negative association between the firmand the
event will be diminished. Impression manage-
ment studies demonstrate how, following (and
sometimes prior to) organizational failures, errors,
or scandals, organizations attempt to influence
stakeholder perceptions (Elsbach, Sutton, &
Principe, 1998; McDonnell & King, 2013). This
strategy isdirectedatboth internal (e.g., employees)
and external (e.g., journalists, NGOs) stakeholders
(Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Desai, 2014a; Elsbach
et al., 1998). In a similar vein, forgetting work con-
ducted via manipulation is aimed at changing,
influencing, and managing stakeholders’ percep-
tions of a corporate irresponsibility event. This will
entail attempts to mitigate the perceived harm
caused by the event, divert attention away from the
event, and distort the attribution of blame. Such at-
tempts will be more successful if the perceived
harm and level of attention are initially low and
blame is not clearly attributed.
Forgetting work can manipulate stakeholders’
perceptions of how harmful an event is, and, as
such, it has an influence on the salience of the
collective memory of the event in the future. For
example, in 2013 a government investigation
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revealed thatmany products being sold as beef in
U.K. supermarkets actually contained horse meat
from Romania. Immediately following the scan-
dal, one of the largest grocery firms involved took
out a one-page newspaper advertisement (in most
daily newspapers) stating that this was a supply
chain breach and that the consumption of horse
meat posed no health risk for consumers. The
question of deception was shifted to one of poten-
tial physical harm, with the majority of medical
experts correctly stating thateatinghorsemeatdid
not constitute a health risk for consumers.
Forgetting work can also involve manipulating
the attention devoted to a corporate irresponsi-
bility event. For instance, a firm and its affiliates
might manipulate narratives targeted at different
stakeholders through the media (Desai, 2014b).
Such a strategy is facilitated by the fact that me-
dia attention is frequently short-lived (Fine, 2012;
Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988; Kleinnijenhuis et al.,
2015). Forgettingwork can aim to change the tenor
of news reporting (e.g., Fine, 2012), diverting at-
tention to another issue (e.g., Zavyalova et al.,
2012), diluting negative perceptions by empha-
sizinggeneric prosocial behavior (e.g.,McDonnell
& King, 2013), or presenting the firm in a more fa-
vorable light (e.g., Desai, 2014a,b; Pfarrer et al.,
2008). For example, following an ecological di-
saster resulting fromoperations at the Talvivaara
nickel mine in Finland, majority owner and CEO
Pekka Pera¨ stated that because of the focus on
environmental issues in news coverage, the
public had ignored the jobs and economic growth
themine had generated in the region (Virta, 2012).
The manipulation of narratives can also occur
inside the firm (Desai, 2014b). Top-down commu-
nication from management about the “official”
framing of an event can influence employees’
knowledge of it (Crossan et al., 1999; Desai, 2014a;
March&Olsen, 1975). These official narratives are
frequently translated into organizationalmemory
and corporate history (Levitt & March 1988;
Rowlinson et al., 2014; Schrempf-Stirling et al.,
2016). Moreover, the narratives that appear im-
mediately after an event can obscure some as-
pects of the event internally (Hedberg, 1981), with
employeessometimesknowing less thanexternal
stakeholders (Argote, 2012).
Forgetting work can also manipulate the way
blame is attributed for a particular corporate ir-
responsibility event. When blame is attributed to
a firm, the firm can react by either accepting or
denying responsibility. Denial is the most likely
response (Zadek, 2004). Firms may also try to shift
responsibility for the failure to other actors, such
as subcontractors. But firms can also accept re-
sponsibility and address issues through either
substantive action (King, 2008; Pfarrer et al., 2008)
or symbolic action (MacLean & Behnam, 2010).
Firms might apologize following a scandal,
ask for forgiveness, and undertake substantive
changes to their controversial practices (Pfarrer
et al., 2008). Substantive changes can also be
forced on themby regulators. Amnesty granted by
a regulator and asking for forgiveness both in-
crease the likelihood of long-term collective for-
getting (Olick, 2007; Ricoeur, 2004). Firms can also
accept responsibility but then engage only in
symbolic or token gestures, making a surface-
level change (that signals compliance) while
leaving actual business practices unaltered
(MacLean & Behnam, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Oliver, 1991). For instance, following the financial
scandals around predatory lending in the wake
of the 2008 crisis, many organizations adopted
ethics training programs but openly argued that
high-risk credit was an industry-level problem
rather than a specific organizational concern
(Admati & Hellwig, 2013). By undertaking cere-
monial rather than substantial changes in this
manner, firmsbothaccept anddeflect blame,with
the hope that forgiveness and ultimately forget-
ting may ensue (Ricoeur, 2004).
Silencing: Forgetting Work on the Stakeholder
Mnemonic Community
In the longer term, forgetting work can also in-
volve silencing members of a mnemonic commu-
nity. This can have a significant influence on
collective forgetting, because the memory of
a past corporate irresponsibility event has to be
sustained by someone (Brockmeier, 2002; Fine,
2012). Silencing members of a mnemonic com-
munity disconnects them from the past event
and from each other, delegitimizes rememberers’
narratives as unworthy of being heard, and ulti-
mately downplays their version of the past event.
Silencing may be conducted at different points in
time, since rememberers can be vocal at different
moments. Silencing will thus be more successful
if rememberers are less coordinated in their re-
membering work and unable to express their
claims meaningfully.
In some cases actors might attempt to silence
remembersbycarefullymonitoring theiractivities.
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Nestle´, for example, hired a private security firm
to infiltrate and spy on activists involved in a vo-
cal NGO called Attac. Its aim was to prevent the
group from divulging compromising information
on Nestle´’s trade union policies (Crevoisier &
Sansonnens, 2012).
Silencing may also function by co-opting cer-
tain rememberers within amnemonic community
and using their point of view to alter the narrative
around the event. Co-optation is “a defensive
mechanism” that integrates the narratives of op-
positional groups “as ameans of averting threats
to [the organization’s] stability or existence”
(Selznick, 1948: 34). This can be particularly ef-
fective when activist groups with strong public
profiles are co-opted. To gain ground on a tar-
geted firm, activist groups must often make con-
cessions or become closer to the firm and so
become less vocal or radical over time as a result
(Jaffee, 2012; Trumpy, 2008; Zald, 2000). Such
a reconfiguration of rememberers’ narratives
further disconnects them from the event and ulti-
mately erodes their remembering work (Trumpy,
2008).
Obviously, the media play an important role in
facilitating the collective remembering of corpo-
rate irresponsibility events (Pfarrer et al., 2008).
Silencing work can thus be directed at the media,
which can be treated as a specific type of re-
memberer. Indeed, firms invest a great deal in
controlling their media communications and how
they are represented in the public realm (Desai,
2014a,b; Zavyalova et al., 2012). We have argued
that forgetting work can manipulate short-term
media attention, but long-term forgetting work
can also focus on silencing themedia. In his study
of a large but long unknown U.S. oil spill in San
Luis Obispo, Beamish (2000) reported that site
managers repeatedly lied (i.e., stated that there
was no spill) to themedia to prevent the release of
potentially damaging news stories.
Silencing may also be aimed at internal stake-
holders. Organizational decision makers can re-
peat official narratives about a past event over
time to prevent employees with “deviant memo-
ries” from speaking up (Levitt & March, 1988: 327;
March & Olsen, 1975). Indeed, the memories of
a lone employee are unlikely to influence collec-
tive memory (Argote, McEvily, & Reagans, 2003),
especially when this employee perceives his or
her viewpoint as that of aminority and, thus, fears
exclusion (Bowen & Blackmon, 2003; Zerubavel,
2006). Barriers to whistle-blowing provide an
apposite example of how employees are silenced
in this manner. Potential whistle-blowers face
immense obstacles to “going public” with their
concerns. These obstacles include organizational
culture and structure (Beamish, 2000; Morrison &
Milliken, 2003), as well as the threat of direct in-
timidation from other members of the organiza-
tion, often including top management (Miethe &
Rothschild, 1994; Warren, 2007). Such barriers are
reinforced by the official story of past events that
has become embedded in the organization over
time. In the case of the San Luis Obispo oil spill,
employees remained silent about the spill for
nearly forty years, not only because they feared
punishment but also because the organization’s
culture implicitly rendered the topic taboo
(Beamish, 2000).
Undermining: Forgetting Work on Collective
Mnemonic Traces
Forgetting workmay also undermine collective
memory by targeting the mnemonic traces of
corporate irresponsibility events (Conway, 2003).
Actors canundermine collectivemnemonic traces
in many ways: by destroying them, preventing
access to them, distorting their meanings and
associatedbeliefs, or even fabricating alternative
traces that promote a different version of the past
event (Booth et al., 2007; Ricoeur, 2004). It is easier
to do this if mnemonic traces are few, weak,
scattered, or even contradictory (Fine, 2001; Nora,
1989; Ricoeur, 2004).
Firms may destroy collective mnemonic traces,
particularly those that are instantiated in amate-
rial artifact. This “structural amnesia” (Assmann,
1995a) is obvious when a firm destroys written
mnemonic traces of a past corporate irresponsi-
bility event, such as records and archives. This is
what happened at HealthSouth (our opening ex-
ample), where visible references to the disgraced
CEO were erased from official documents and
architecture. In a related example, monuments
erected near Australian steel works to commem-
orate workers killed in industrial accidents were
removedby the companyduring “redevelopment”
(Ryan & Wray-Bliss, 2012).
Undermining forgetting work can also be con-
ducted by inventing new, alternative traces. For
example, the tobacco industry is known to have
fabricated scientific evidence and reports “prov-
ing” that smoking tobacco is harmless (Palazzo &
Mena, 2009). Nonmaterial mnemonic traces are
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fabricated by creating alternative narratives.
Greenwashing, typically, is an attempt to un-
dermine and reconfigure the beliefs related to
a firm’s environmental behavior (Delmas &
Cuerel Burbano, 2011). Bansal and Clelland
(2004) found that firms with low environmental
legitimacy can nevertheless preserve their long-
term reputation by repeatedly communicating
about the natural environment and expressing
their commitment to sustainable environmental
practices, even when this commitment does not
exist.
Yet another way that forgetting work can un-
dermine collective mnemonic traces is by pre-
venting a mnemonic community from accessing
them. For example, a firm may divest from a re-
gion so that there is no longer a symbolically
charged target to animate collectivememory, or it
may restructure the organization to “outsource”
blame to a subsidiary (Pfarrer et al., 2008). This is
exemplified in the case of Anadarko, a petroleum
firm that recently “gifted” abandoned, contami-
nated sites to a subsidiary, Kerr-McGee. The
mnemonic traces that might have aided collec-
tive recollection literally disappeared.Moreover,
Kerr-Mcgee was restructured and sold its envi-
ronmental debt to another company that, in the
meantime, filed for bankruptcy (Cappiello &
Tucker, 2014).
Forgetting work may also distort mnemonic
traces by changing the norms and beliefs asso-
ciated with them. This type of forgetting work
deploys new mnemonic traces to tell an official
story that aims to overshadow other ways of por-
traying the event (Crossan et al., 1999; Levitt &
March, 1988). As a result, stakeholders who have
profound and often disturbing memories of an
event can find their memories being written out,
marginalized, or excluded from the official nar-
rative (Conway, 2003). For example, indigenous
people in Australia who were violently displaced
by the expansion of agricultural and mining in-
dustries argue that their suffering was actively
obscured by official narratives of progress, mod-
ernization, and civilization. As a result, defining
indigenous experiences and beliefs associated
with their ancestral lands were undermined
(Manne, 2001), aiding the overall dispossession
process.
The same process applies to the deviant mem-
ories that employees may hold. The induction of
new employees can significantly decrease the
importance of disturbing mnemonic traces in the
workforce by socializing them with values and
beliefs (March, 1991) that omit more controversial
elements of the past (Zerubavel, 1996). For exam-
ple, Rowlinson (2002) described howCadbury tells
its own corporate history in the context of the
Cadbury World museum and the booklet “The
Cadbury Story.” In both, any uncomfortable con-
nections to the slave labor used to produce cocoa
in the past are absent.
Reconfiguration of Collective Memory and
Consequences of Collective Forgetting
Forgetting work ultimately reconfigures the
collectivememory of a past event. Forgettingwork
aids reconfiguration because it reframes the past
event in such a manner that it becomes more
susceptible to recall failure. In the context of cor-
porate irresponsibility, this is why much forget-
ting work is aimed at creating an alternative
versionof apast event that distances the firm from
its responsibility for that event (e.g., Fine, 2001). In
particular, silencing those who support an ac-
count of the event in which the firm is responsible
enables the formulation of an alternative version
of the past (Fine, 2012). Alternative versions of the
past often selectively evoke the past or even claim
that certain past events are irrelevant to present
matters (Assmann, 1995a). Moreover, when a past
corporate irresponsibility event becomes irrele-
vant to the present, it no longer has any sort of
impact on present practices or beliefs and will
cease to serve as a template for similar actions in
the future (Fine, 2012). Ultimately, we propose
that this will lead to the absence of an in-
stitutionalized collective memory of the event,
which equates to collective forgetting (Assmann,
1995a; Brockmeier, 2002; Fine, 2012).
With the collective forgetting of past instances
of corporate irresponsibility, firms are able to
maintain their organizational identity through
denial or rationalization (Brown & Starkey, 2000;
Gabriel, 1999; Pearson & Clair, 1998). The forget-
ting or remembering of specific events related to
the focal firm by stakeholders has a strong influ-
ence on how the identity of the firm is perceived
(Scott & Lane, 2000). Because “disasters call into
question the social legitimacy and continued so-
cietal sanctioning of hazardous organizations, in-
dustries, and technologies” (Levitt &March, 1988:
324), forgetting also serves to legitimate the firm
in its environment and to stabilize relationships
with stakeholders, thereby ensuring its survival
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(Connerton, 2008;Erdelyi, 1990;Olick, 2007;Ricoeur,
2004). As such, collective forgetting has a number
of positive consequences for the firm and the
mnemonic community.
However, collective forgetting has negative con-
sequences as well, the greatest of these being the
failure to learn from past mistakes (e.g., Brunsson,
2009; Cannon & Edmondson, 2005; Madsen, 2009).
For example, research on the mining industry
suggests that, on average, firms tend to learn
from disasters to some extent, but such learning
diminishes over time as these events are forgot-
ten (Madsen, 2009). While knowledge acquired
through failure depreciates more slowly than
knowledge from success (Madsen & Desai, 2010),
we suggest that instrumental forgetting work
may mitigate this process. As a result, funda-
mental lessons that may be learned from orga-
nizational failure remain untapped, and similar
failures are likely to happen again (Easterby-
Smith & Lyles, 2011). Furthermore, firms are less
likely to learn from others’mistakes if this occurs
(Madsen, 2009). This is illustrated by the recent
history of the Bangladeshi garment industry.
Several incidents that threatened the lives of
factory workers, including factory collapses in
2005, 2006, and 2010 and a lethal factory fire in
2012, were actively forgotten by management.
Tragically, these events were followed by the
Rana Plaza factory collapse in 2013 that claimed
thousands of lives (Human Rights Watch, 2013),
an event that is now much more salient in col-
lective memory compared to previous similar
incidents.
We also argue that as an event is forgotten,
stakeholder pressure on the firm will weaken,
which, in turn, will prompt members of the orga-
nization to increasingly forget lessons from the
past. Thus, even if some routines have been put
in place following an irresponsibility event,
the firm will eventually relax the observance of
those routines as a result of gradual forgetting
(Madsen,2009).Theresult is that itwillbecomemore
likely the event will occur again (Easterby-Smith &
Lyles, 2011).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article we have developed a conceptual
model to explain how some corporate irresponsi-
bility events are forgotten despite their traumatic
nature. Drawing on social and organizational
memorystudies,wehaveproposed thatacorporate
irresponsibility event can form a stakeholder
mnemonic community comprising different ac-
tors who are bound together by a particular
memory of that event. This community generates
and draws onmnemonic traces as it seeks to keep
that collectivememory relevant.Wehave focused
on how forgetting work can impede such at-
tempts. Forgetting work can, in the short term,
manipulate the immediate reactions to the event
and, in the longer term, silence members of the
mnemonic community and undermine collective
mnemonic traces. While other forces might also
lead to collective forgetting, we have suggested
that forgetting work can facilitate the reconfigu-
ration of collective memory and the collective
forgetting of a corporate irresponsibility event.
Severalmoderatingeffectswill influencewhether
forgetting work is successful or not. The model is
also subject to a number of limitations that may
guide future research and contributions in this
area.
Moderating Effects
It is reasonable to assume that there will be
cases in which attempts to encourage collective
forgetting do not succeed, or at least are not as
effective as expected. One way to identify the
most salient boundary conditions of the forgetting
work modeled in this article is to examine mod-
erating effects that might make forgetting work
more or less likely to be effective. We approach
the issue in thismanner becausewedonot expect
one type of forgetting work to be more effective
than another in general. Although forgettingwork
can be conducted in singular instances (e.g., only
at the outset of the event), we assume that it is
most effective when carried out over time, in re-
sponse to shifting and contingent conditions.
Moreover, we have demonstrated how firms can
manipulate the initial conditions of corporate ir-
responsibility events—notably, by denying or
accepting responsibility.While the choice of such
short-term responses is likely to shape the longer-
term collective memory process, this does not
prevent firms and other actors interested in for-
getting from undertaking forgetting work concur-
rently or at later points in time. More specifically,
we identify five moderating effects that may in-
fluence the effectiveness of forgetting work.
First, the initial conditions of corporate irre-
sponsibility events (the degree of harm, the level
of attention attracted, and the attribution of
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blame) will likely determine the amount of ma-
nipulating forgettingwork required to successfully
bring about the collective forgetting of an event.
When the levels of harm and attention around an
event of corporate irresponsibility are high and
when an organization is unambiguously blamed
for the event, forgetting work is likely to be less
successful. This is because the event will be in-
herently more memorable, given its emotional
resonance (Schacter, 1995, 2002; Schudson, 1995). In
such cases remembrance of the event may persist
despite the forgetting work undertaken.
Second, power must invariably play a role in
determiningwhetheractorsengaged in forgetting
work are able to effectively silence stakeholders
and impede the formation of a robust mnemonic
community. The level of power held by members
of a mnemonic community will influence their
capacity to perform authoritative remembering
work. When rememberers have the power to co-
ordinate and engage in organized mnemonic ac-
tion, silencing them will be more difficult and
less likely to lead to rapid collective forgetting
(Armstrong &Crage, 2006; Fine, 2012). The same is
true when rememberers are less accommodating
to a firm, which will reduce the likelihood that
their collective narrative will be co-opted. The
collective remembering or forgetting of a past
event will therefore hinge in large part on the
mnemonic struggle that ensues and on the power
of the actors involved.
Third, while undermining mnemonic traces at
different points in time can hasten collective
forgetting, this will depend on the number, sub-
stance, and cohesion of these traces. When col-
lectivemnemonic traces are numerous and easily
accessible to stakeholders, forgettingwork is less
likely to facilitate rapid collective forgetting, be-
cause stakeholders can draw on these traces
more easily to collectively remember (Fine, 2001;
Nora, 1989; Ricoeur, 2004). Whenmnemonic traces
exist but are contradictory or dispersed, firms
involved in a corporate irresponsibility event
can weave alternative narratives more easily
(Spillman, 1998). Forgetting work is likely to be
more successful in such cases. Efforts to under-
mine collective memory will also be affected by
the intensity of the emotions attached to mne-
monic traces. If traces are institutionalized and
taken for granted (i.e., not marginal) in the mne-
monic community, forgetting work will probably
be less successful in hastening the process of
collective forgetting (Fine, 2012).
Fourth, we suggest that the speed with which
a firmassumes full responsibility for anevent and
asks for forgiveness from stakeholders is likely to
facilitate collective forgetting, especially if the
firm undertakes substantive changes to prevent
the recurrence of similar events (Ricoeur, 2004).
However, while a firm may ask for forgiveness
from the outset (immediately following an event),
it may still engage in forgetting work at the same
time or later on. In some cases a firm might ac-
cept responsibility but still seek to silence some
stakeholders, as has occurred among corpora-
tions involved in the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill.
Therefore, we propose that forgettingworkwill be
more effective and will lead to collective forget-
tingmore rapidlywhen all three types of work are
conducted over time and when responsibility is
assumed rather thandeniedor onlyadmitted long
after the event.
And fifth, if the event is singular and unique in
a specific organizational field—rendering it
a stand-alone incident—then we suggest that
forgetting work will be more difficult to accom-
plish than if the event is merely one of many
similar events. This is because an event grouping
that overpopulates an industry or sector will tend
to dilute the attention that may have otherwise
been attributed to one particular firm (Barnett,
2006; Desai, 2011). Forgetting work can be expe-
dited if the event is deemed an “industry prob-
lem,” rather than an individual organization one.
Limitations and Future Research
Our argument inevitably brings with it a num-
ber of limitations and unaddressed issues. These
may inform future research on this topic. First,
while we have built on social and organizational
memory studies, we have not fully explored the
impact of collective forgetting on internal orga-
nizational processes ofmemoryand forgetting.As
we have noted, employees may play a more or
less active role in forgetting, depending on the
nature of the corporate irresponsibility event.
While we have emphasized the role of employees
in our model of collective forgetting, we believe
more research is required to understand the pre-
cise interactions between memory at the mne-
monic community level and memory at the
organizational level. For example, how can ex-
ternal and internal stakeholders interact more
meaningfully in order to embed knowledge from
past transgressions in a firm’s routines?
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Second,more research is required tounderstand
how the different types of forgetting work we have
identified interact in concrete organizational set-
tings. For example, we have assumed that each
form of forgetting work reinforces the others in
a processual manner. However, more attention
could be devoted to exploring precisely how dif-
ferent forms of forgetting work impede or poten-
tially reinforce one another. Special attention
might be given to how the process of forgetting
interacts with the dynamics of remembering. Ex-
amining the interplay between these forms of re-
membering and forgetting work more closely is
likely to yield insights into the process of reconfi-
guring collective memory.
A third limitationandavenue for future research
involves the role of forgiveness in collective for-
getting. We usually assume that repentance
leads to forgiveness, which will, in turn, wash
away past transgressions and help us forget
and move on (Ricoeur, 2004). As we have men-
tioned, forgiveness-seeking behavior does not
necessarily prevent actors from undertaking
forgetting work. But what exactly are the in-
teractional dynamics between the request for
forgiveness and the subsequent deployment of
the different types of forgetting work? More-
over, the link between forgiveness and the
memories of past transgressions (especially in
the long term) is still conceptually tenuous in
our argument. If forgiveness is granted, for ex-
ample, is the corporate irresponsibility event
forgotten, or does it simply lose its harsher
negative connotations?
Our model risks imputing an unrealistically
rational agent as the driver of forgetting work,
which is the fourth limitation thatmight be further
explored. To what extent is forgetting work by
firms, managers, or other actors intentional and
coordinated? The question has a number of in-
teresting implications, especially in relation to
business ethics. We have acknowledged that
collective forgetting has clear benefits for the focal
organization and sometimes for other stake-
holders. But it can also yieldnegative outcomes for
society in general, especially in terms of repeated
mistakes and harm. Are forgetting workers cogni-
zant of this ethical component when engaging
in instrumental forgetting work? What would that
imply for how we think about corporate re-
sponsibility and the role of firms in society? If for-
gettingwork is the norm rather than the exception,
we suggest an exploration of how more authentic
collective memories might be supported, because,
as Schacter vividly puts it, “a memory system that
consistently produced seriously distorted outputs
would wreak havoc with our very existence”
(1995: 2).
Contributions
In this article we have sought to extend a num-
ber of existing debates in the study of corporate
responsibility, as well as the study of memory in
organization and management studies. First, we
have developed the existing literature on re-
actions to corporate irresponsibility (e.g., Barnett,
2014; Hendry, 2005). Much of this research tends to
concentrate on the short-term processes of audi-
ence evaluation, attention, and sensemaking of
harmful events, as well as the politics of blame
attribution (Lange & Washburn, 2012) and forgive-
ness (Pfarrer et al., 2008). By focusing on issues of
(collective) memory, our argument highlights how
an instance of corporate irresponsibility can have
an impact that extends far beyond the audience’s
immediate evaluation of events. And this longer-
term impact is constructed and reconstructed in an
ongoing manner by different actors (Fine, 2001).
Thus, a complete understanding of how stake-
holders evaluate corporate irresponsibility needs
to incorporate the long-term development of mne-
monic processes and the social forces that can
thwart and undermine how we remember a trau-
matic event.
The second debate we have contributed to
concerns memory in organization and manage-
ment studies. Several areas of research have
identified howmemory in organizations becomes
a collective achievement that is reached through
organizational routines (Arthur & Huntley, 2005;
Levitt & March, 1988; Walsh & Ungson, 1991) and
the articulation and circulation of narratives,
stories, and experiences (Anteby & Molna´r, 2012;
Booth et al., 2007), and how it can ultimately serve
to establish a competitive advantage (Argote,
2012; Foster et al., 2011; Suddaby et al., 2010).
However, we note that memory is not only
reducible to organizational-level or competi-
tive dynamics within a population of firms
(e.g., Madsen, 2009) but can also pertain to and be
shaped by mnemonic communities of stake-
holders who operate at a supraorganizational
level with little interest in the firm’s competi-
tiveness. Even if a firm and its competitors
may have forgotten a particular past event, the
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collective memory of that event may still be
relevant to actors outside these firms.
As well as articulating a broader conceptuali-
zation of memory, we explore another aspect of
the mnemonic process: forgetting. Many contem-
porary organizations appear togo togreat lengths
to guarantee that lessons learned from the past
are forgotten and eliminated from organizational
memory (Alvesson, 2013; Brunsson, 2009; Nystrom
& Starbuck, 1984). We believe this forgetting work
is a central reasonwhyparticularmemories come
to be excluded from the shared narratives that
stakeholders have of an organization.We suggest
that forgetting does not only imply the positive
consequences that existing research has tended
to emphasize (e.g., de Holan & Phillips, 2004; de
Holan, Phillips,&Lawrence, 2004). It canalsohave
morenegative social implications. In particular, it
can facilitate an inability to learn from past mis-
takes, encouraging the repetition of questionable
and evenharmful courses of action (Brunsson, 2009;
Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2011). Forgetting might
even serve as a sort of resource for perpetuating
questionable behavior in a systematic fashion.
In this respect, we hope this article inspires fu-
ture research into the wider implications of how
major instances of corporate irresponsibility
are remembered and forgotten.
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